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ABSTRACT 
The Active Denial System (ADS) is unlike any other 
nonviolent weapon: instead of incapacitating its targets, it forces 
them to flee, and it does so without being seen or heard. Though 
it is a promising new crowd-control tool for law-enforcement, 
excessive-force claims involving the ADS will create a Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudential paradox. Moreover, the resolution of 
that paradox could undermine other constitutional principles—
like equality, fairness, and free speech. Ultimately, the ADS 
serves as a warning that without legislation, American 
jurisprudence may not be ready for the next generation of law-
enforcement technology and the novel excessive-force claims 
sure to follow. 
INTRODUCTION 
 It goes by different names: “pain ray,”1 “heat ray,”2 and “ray 
gun”3 are some of its more colorful monikers. The United States military 
calls it the “Active Denial System”4 (ADS) and it is unlike any weapon 
ever used.5 The ADS, which looks a bit like an old television dish 
attached to a vehicle, works by shooting a concentrated beam of 
electromagnetic waves at its target—a person.6 Once emitted from the 
                                                      
† J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law. 
1 Ross Kerber, The Ray Gun, Sci-Fi Staple, Meets Reality, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
24, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WLNR 3577433. 
2 Patrick Jackson, How Hot Is The Heat-Ray Gun?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 26, 2007, 
2:49 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6300985.stm. 
3 Kerber, supra note 1. 
4 Id. Smaller versions exist. Id. 
5 See generally, Andrew Milner, Non-Lethal Weapon: Active Denial System 
(ADS), YOUTUBE (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kzG4oEu 
tPbA. 
6 Ed Cumming, The Active Denial System: The Weapon That's A Hot Topic, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 20, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/science/7900117/The-Active-Denial-System-the-weapon-thats-a-hot-
topic.html.  
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ADS, the waves penetrate the target’s clothes7 and the outermost layers 
of the target’s skin.8 Within mere seconds of being hit with the waves, 
the individual is struck with the sensation of being in a hot oven.9 Upon 
experiencing this sensation, the target instinctively moves out of the way 
of the beam10—a result one observer described as “the goodbye effect.”11 
After leaving the beam, however, the feeling of being in a hot oven 
quickly subsides, exacting no permanent damage or lasting effect upon 
the subject.12  
 A device that forces an individual to say “goodbye” without 
causing any serious or lasting harm holds great promise as the next 
generation of non-lethal crowd-control weaponry. And given the 
potential of the ADS to become the “holy grail of crowd-control,”13 it is 
no wonder that law-enforcement officials have expressed interest in 
obtaining the military technology for domestic use.14 At least one prison 
has already installed the ADS as an experimental nonlethal method of 
disrupting prison assaults.15 
 But prospective use of the ADS by law-enforcement to control 
crowds, especially in light of so many recent national and international 
                                                      
7David Hambling, Say Hello to the Goodbye Weapon, WIRED (Dec. 5, 2006), 
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/12/72134?currentPage=al
l. 
8 Cumming, supra note 6. 
9 Jennifer Hlad, $120 Million Heat Ray Waiting for First Action, STARS AND 
STRIPES (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-
central-1.8040/120-million-heat-ray-waiting-for-first-action-1.171170. 
10 Cumming, supra note 6; Henry S. Kenyon, Heat Ray Warms Up For 
Operation, SIGNAL (Apr. 2009), http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/ 
templates/Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1896&zoneid=257. 
11 Hambling, supra note 7. 
12 Id.; Cumming, supra note 6; Kenyon, supra note 10.  
13 Rania Khalek, Pepper Spray, Tasers, and LRADs — What's Behind the 
Explosion of 'Less Lethal' Weapons for Crowd Control?, ALTERNET, 4 (Dec. 5, 
2011), http://www.alternet.org/occupywallst/153329/pepper_spray,_tasers,_and 
_lrads_%E2%80%94_what's_behind_the_explosion_of_'less_lethal'_weapons_f
or_crowd_control/?page=4.  
14 Id. 
15 Press Release, Los Angeles Cnty. Sherrif’s Dep’t, Los Angeles County 
Sherrif’s Department Tested New Device Unveiled Intended to Stop or Lessen 
Inmate Assaults (Aug. 20, 2010), available at media/detail/?WCM_ 
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/lasd+content/lasd+site/home/home+top+stories/aid+un
vealed. 
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protests,16 raises an important question: What are the excessive-force 
implications of such a cutting-edge, but reportedly safe and effective, 
law-enforcement device?17   
 This Issue Brief explores that question. It does so by asking the 
reader to reimagine the now infamous U.C. Davis pepperspray incident18 
as if the police had used the ADS instead of pepperspray. This inquiry 
reveals that, although the ADS is a promising new law-enforcement 
weapon, excessive-force claims arising from its use will create a Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudential paradox: individuals subjected to the ADS 
are simultaneously seized and not seized under the Fourth Amendment. 
Resolving this paradox may undermine some of this country’s most 
cherished constitutional principles, such as equality, fairness, and free 
speech. Ultimately, the ADS serves as a warning that absent legislation, 
American jurisprudence may not be ready for the next generation of law-
enforcement technology and the novel excessive-force claims sure to 
follow. 
I. ACTIVE DENIAL SYSTEMS AS COMPARED TO OTHER NONLETHAL 
WEAPONS 
 Before discussing the excessive-force implications of the ADS, it 
is important to ascertain a comprehensive understanding of the system 
and how it works. This Section will conduct a comparison between the 
ADS and other commonly used nonlethal weapons, and in so doing will 
illustrate the unique capability of the ADS within the realm of crowd-
control technology. 
A. The Active Denial System 
 The ADS emits a concentrated beam of electromagnetic waves 
known as millimeter waves.19 Millimeter waves are also used in other, 
more accessible technologies, such as airport scanners.20 Unlike airport 
scanners, however, the ADS emits a wave capable of piercing clothing as 
                                                      
16 See generally Kurt Andersen, Time Person Of The Year: The Protestor, TIME, 
Dec. 14, 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/ 
0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373-1,00.html. 
17 Hambling, supra note 7. 
18 Jens Erik Gould, A Sleepy Campus in Crisis: Pepper Spray at UC Davis 
Sparks Online Uproar, Calls for a Chancellor's Resignation, TIME (Nov. 21, 
2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2099919,00.html#ixzz1p 
Dfs6uQc.  
19 Hambling, supra note 7. The waves operate at 94 GHZ on the electromagnetic 
spectrum. Id. 
20 Millimeter Wave Scanner, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millim 
eter_wave_scanner (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
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well as the outer two layers of human skin.21 When the wave enters a 
water or fat molecule, the encounter produces a significant amount of 
heat.22 The device is capable of raising the temperature of water and fat 
molecules in the skin by as much as 50°C, or 122°F.23 One individual 
who was subjected to testing described the feeling as “unbearably 
uncomfortable, like opening a roasting hot oven door.”24 Any individual 
caught in the beam instinctively moves away from the beam, and with 
haste.25 The United States military reports that most individuals could not 
stand in the beam for more than three seconds, and no one tested resisted 
the beam for more than five seconds.26 
 As soon as the individual leaves the beam, the heating sensation 
subsides, and no lasting or permanent injury results.27 The military 
performed extensive testing—more than 10,000 individual exposures—
to verify that exposure does not have any long term or unanticipated ill 
effects.28 In all of the military testing, the worst injury reported was a 
second-degree burn29 suffered as a result of a “laboratory accident.”30 
When used in the field, the device, at worst, produced blistering in a few 
individuals and usually produced no discernible lasting effect.31 Also, 
according to the military, there is no indication the device has or even 
can cause cancer.32 
 To be sure, the device does carry the theoretical and technical 
potential to cause serious and even life-threatening injury. First, the 
military’s test subjects were permitted fifteen-second respites from the 
device, which is something that may not occur during real use.33 
Additionally, according to Dr. Jürgen Altmann at the University of 
                                                      
21 Hambling, supra note 7. 
22 Cumming, supra note 6. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
25 See Hambling, supra note 7 (calling it “the Goodbye effect”). 
26 Id. Note, the military never tested the device on Chuck Norris. 
27 Press Release, Los Angeles Cnty. Sherrif’s Dep’t, supra note 15. 
28 Hambling, supra note 7. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. Concerned with what potential effects the ADS would have on eyes, 
military scientists tested the device on monkeys. Id. Apparently, scientists had to 
hold open the eyes of the monkeys to achieve any result at all because the 
monkeys would all instinctively close their eyelids in response to the beam. Id. 
According to the scientists, the cornea fully recovered within twenty-four hours 
of testing. Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Cumming, supra note 6. 
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Dortmund, the device is capable of producing second and third degree 
burns, which can be life threatening if they cover more than 20% of the 
body.34 According to the Pentagon’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Directorate spokesperson, the device contains sensors that enable its 
operator to know whom the beam is striking and if those individuals are 
unable to move out of its path.35 But as Dr. Altmann warns, “[w]ithout a 
technical device that reliably prevents re-triggering on the same subject, 
the ADS has a potential to produce permanent injury or death.”36 
Pentagon officials are nevertheless confident that the device’s rigorous 
testing and the 80-hour training course for operators will ensure the ADS 
works as intended, even when deployed in real world situations.37 
B. Other Nonlethal Weapons 
1. The TASER 
 Though the TASER is also classified as a nonlethal weapon, its 
use is not as harmless or as humorous as the viral “Don’t Tase me, bro!” 
YouTube video suggests.38 A TASER uses a gas-based propellant to 
launch a pair of darts from the gun to its target.39 When the darts attach 
to the target, they transfer a painful 50,000-volt charge of electricity into 
the person, forcing the individual’s muscles to contract uncontrollably as 
the electricity disrupts the target’s central nervous system.40 Most targets 
scream in pain and fall down, giving law-enforcement a momentary 
                                                      
34 Khalek, supra note 13, at 3. 
35 Cumming, supra note 6.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. Of course, the safety of any typically nonlethal but potentially lethal device 
depends in part on its proper calibration and use. Manufacturers and operators 
must remain vigilant to ensure safety. This, by necessity, requires proper testing 
and training. But even then, as with any electronic device, it can malfunction 
unexpectedly and even trained operators can abuse it. 
38 Bradlee92, REMIX: "Can't Tase This" UF Student Tasered, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
20, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xzkd_m4ivmc. 
39 Michelle E. McStravick, Note, The Shocking Truth: Law Enforcement's Use 
and Abuse of Tasers and the Need for Reform, 56 VILL. L. REV. 363, 365–66 
(2011). 
40 Id. at 366. 
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window of opportunity to safely arrest the target.41 The TASER’s effects 
subside immediately and usually produce no serious or lasting injuries.42  
 In practice, however, the device exemplifies how a lack of 
training, abuse, and less than ideal circumstances can produce 
unanticipated and severe consequences. For example, police officers in 
Oklahoma reportedly TASERed an 86-year-old woman after the police 
became afraid when she adopted a “more aggressive posture,” while 
lying in her hospital bed.43 In another instance, officers TASERed a 14 
year old girl with epilepsy as she fled from the police;44 one of the darts 
pierced her skull.45 One man was TASERed while in a tree; he fell and 
became a paraplegic.46 Though these stories provide horrifying 
testimonials, statistics tell the most damning story. Amnesty International 
reported that over an eight-year reporting period beginning in 2001, 334 
people died as result of TASERing.47 Amnesty argues that this makes the 
TASER something other than a nonlethal weapon, despite the assurances 
of the manufacturer to the contrary.48 
 In contrast to plaintiffs’ and Amnesty International’s position on 
the use of TASERs, courts and judges have been less skeptical of the 
weapon. Courts generally declare the use of TASERs excessive only 
when the arrestee does not resist arrest or has already been detained.49 
But courts are more reluctant to hold the use of a TASER to be excessive 
when an arrestee “actively resist[s] arrest by physically struggling with, 
threatening, or disobeying officers.”50 And despite the Ninth Circuit 
                                                      
41 See, e.g., WPMT Fox 43, FOX Reporter Gets Tazed, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 
2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&v=tJ1FzYZPP74&NR=1 
(showing reporter TASERed, but then getting up immediately afterward). 
42 The manufacturer even uses an odometer graphic on its website to boast how 
many lives the device has supposedly saved, adding a countdown predicting 
when the next life will be saved. TASER INT’L, INC., http://www.taser.com/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
43 McStravick, supra note 39, at 363 (citing Complaint at 4, Varner v. City of El 
Reno, No. CIV-00636-F (W.D. Okla. June 21, 2010)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Harper v. Perkins, 459 F. App’x 822, 824 (11th Cir. 2012). 
47 TASERs--Potentially Lethal and Easy to Abuse, AMNESTY INT'L (Dec. 16, 
2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/tasers-potentially-
lethal-and-easy-abuse-20081216. 
48 Id. 
49 Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2012). 
50 Id. at 495.  
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declaring the use of TASERs an intermediate level of force, requiring a 
strong governmental justification,51 Chief Judge Kozinski has sung the 
TASER’s praises. Judge Kozinski believes that although nonlethal force 
has potential drawbacks and can cause injury, the TASER is not only a 
particularly safe alternative to deadly force for those subjected to its 
effects, but it is a much safer alternative for police officers who need not 
step into harm’s way when using it, unlike other nonlethal forms of force 
such as batons or pepperspray which require up-close application.52 
2. Pepperspray 
 Pepperspray is a sprayable chemical irritant made from some of 
Earth’s spiciest plants, including the cayenne pepper.53 The active 
ingredient, cyoleoresin capsicum, incapacitates individuals by producing 
a burning sensation on the skin, causing shortness of breath, inflaming 
the respiratory tract, and causing fear and disorientation by producing 
tears in the eyes and causing the eyelids to swell shut.54 These effects 
greatly weaken the subject and provide law-enforcement with a 
momentary advantage.55 A National Institute of Justice study concluded 
that death as a result of pepperspray is extremely rare, and the vast 
majority of reported pepperspray-related deaths are actually the result of 
something else, such as drug use.56 
 Still, courts consistently hold that the use of pepperspray 
constitutes excessive-force when the alleged offense is minor, the 
“arrestee surrenders, is secure, and is not acting violently,” and there 
exists no threat to the safety of the police officer or anyone else.57 
Conversely, courts consistently hold that the use of pepperspray is 
reasonable when the arrestee resists arrest or refuses police requests.58 
One court went so far as to say that “pepper spray is a very reasonable 
alternative to escalating a physical struggle with an arrestee.”59 
                                                      
51 Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 2010). 
52 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 454 (9th Cir. 2011). 
53 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OLEORESIN CAPSICUM: PEPPER SPRAY AS A FORCE 
ALTERNATIVE 1 (Mar. 1994), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 
1/nij/grants/181655.pdf. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY OF PEPPER 
SPRAY, 1 (Apr. 2003), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/195739. 
pdf. 
57 Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002). 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
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C. Comparing ADS, TASERs, and Pepperspray 
 When compared to the ADS, both pepperspray and TASERs 
appear to be very similar to one another. Unlike the ADS, both 
pepperspray and TASERs are only effective at short range—several 
yards at most. In stark contrast, the ADS is effective at close, medium, or 
long range—in excess of a mile away from the target—though police 
cannot yet carry the ADS on their person like they can pepperspray or 
TASERs. Also, despite the fact that pepperspray is capable of targeting 
multiple individuals, no other nonlethal weapon rivals the ADS’s ability 
to control crowds. Unlike either pepperspray or TASERs, the ADS’s 
application of force is completely invisible and totally inaudible.60 This 
means that the total exposure one receives cannot be easily tracked. But 
it also means that the individual subjected to the beam has no idea what 
is happening to them, unlike with a TASER or pepperspray. Finally, and 
most importantly for the purpose of excessive-force jurisprudence, 
instead of using heat to incapacitate its targets, the ADS uses heat to 
force its targets to flee.61 This combination of differences makes the ADS 
truly unique from the other methods of nonlethal enforcement. 
 In other ways, the three weapons are quite similar. Each device 
manipulates human biology in such a way that the target is forced to 
comply, overcoming resistance and giving the police an advantage. 
Additionally, each weapon is technically capable of causing extreme 
pain, serious injury, and in rare cases, even death. But for each device, 
the typical application of force produces only temporary, non-life-
threatening pain or injuries. Consequently, each technology is most 
properly classified as nonlethal. 
II. EXCESSIVE-FORCE JURISPRUDENCE 
 Excessive-force claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 To state a 
valid claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a 
protected constitutional or statutory right.63 To resolve a claim, courts 
perform a three-step inquiry. First, courts identify the specific 
constitutional right allegedly violated by the defendant’s use of force.64 
The constitutional provision recognizing that right becomes the 
controlling standard for measuring excessiveness.65 Second, the court 
                                                      
60 Jackson, supra note 2. 
61 Press Release, supra note 16. 
62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
63 Id. 
64 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 
65 See id. at 395–96 (describing how § 1983 claims work)  
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must determine whether the defendant’s use of force actually violated the 
governing constitutional standard.66 Third, because public officials enjoy 
qualified immunity, the court must determine whether the constitutional 
right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s actions.67 
A. Choosing the Standard of Conduct Most Appropriate For the 
Excessive-Force Claim  
 First, the court must identify the most appropriate statutory or 
constitutional provision with which to measure the defendant-officer’s 
conduct. According to the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor,68 the 
appropriate standard for excessive-force claims is usually the Fourth 
Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard or the Eighth Amendment’s 
“cruel and unusual punishment” standard.69 If the excessive-force claim 
arises from a search or seizure, then the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness standard applies.70  
 Seizure occurs “only when there is a governmental termination 
of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.”71 As 
Justice Scalia noted in California v. Hodari,72 a reasonable belief that 
one is “not free to leave” is necessary before a seizure is said to occur, 
but is not sufficient by itself to constitute a seizure.73 Something more 
must happen before an individual has been “seized” for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, such as the application of physical force by the 
police.74 A seizure can also constitute a show of authority that results in 
submission or compliance by the person the police are attempting to 
seize.75 The mere demonstration of police authority, without compliance 
by the civilian, is not enough to constitute seizure.76  
 A court may turn to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause only after a determination that no other more specific 
                                                      
66 Id. at 394. 
67 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
68 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 394–95 (listing investigatory stops, arrests, and “other seizures” as 
giving rise to Fourth Amendment section 1983 claims). 
71 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989). 
72 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
73 Id. at 628 (quoting U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 
74 Id. at 626. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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constitutional provisions apply.77 The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment states that “no State shall deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”78 Therefore, when a 
police officer uses force against an individual outside the ambit of either 
the Fourth or Eighth Amendments’ protections, the due process clause is 
the only remaining source of constitutional protection for any resulting 
Section 1983 excessive-force claim.79  
B. Deciding Whether Use of Force Violates The Governing 
Standard 
 After the court determines the controlling constitutional 
standard, it must decide whether the use of force violated that standard.  
1. Excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment 
 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.80 Reasonableness applies in two distinct ways. 
First, an officer may seize an individual whenever it is reasonable under 
the circumstances.81 An arrest based upon probable cause that a crime 
has been committed, or an investigatory stop based upon reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, are both examples of when 
seizure is considered reasonable.82 Second, even if a seizure is justified, 
it still must be executed reasonably, because “the reasonableness of a 
particular seizure depends not only on when it is made, but also on how 
it is carried out.”83 
 Excessive-force claims concern the unreasonableness of the 
amount or type of force used, not whether the police were authorized by 
law to seize the individual in the first place.84 Accordingly, excessive-
                                                      
77 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989) (dramatically limiting 
the use of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process to resolve 
excessive-force claims but not precluding it for that purpose when neither the 
Fourth or Eighth Amendments would apply to an excessive-force claim). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
79 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394–95 (leaving open the possibility that the 
Fourteenth Amendment could apply to excessive-force claims even when the 
Fourth and Eighth Amendments do not). 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
81 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“The question is whether in all the 
circumstances . . . [the individual’s] right to personal security was violated by an 
unreasonable search and seizure.”). 
82 Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009). 
83 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
84 See, e.g., Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1126 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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force claims must have a separate factual basis from an unauthorized 
search claim to survive summary judgment.85  
 The right to make an investigatory stop or arrest comes with the 
corresponding right to use an objectively reasonable degree of force to 
effectuate that stop or arrest.86 But “reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical 
application.”87 The reasonableness of any particular use of force is 
determined by the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited 
to, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”88 Courts 
may also consider the nature of the seizure—that is, whether the seizure 
was merely an investigatory stop or an actual arrest.89 Determinations 
also require a careful balancing of the governmental and private interests 
at stake.90 Finally, reasonableness must “allow[] for the fact that police 
officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”91 Thus, the 
use of force is judged objectively from the perspective of “a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”92 It 
also means that “[n]ot every push or shove” is excessive “even if it may 
later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers.”93 
2. Excessive-Force Claims Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
 Prior to Graham v. Connor, lower courts regularly evaluated 
excessive-force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive 
due process clause, with Johnson v. Glick94 serving as the jurisprudential 
                                                      
85 See id. (“Thus, in a case where police effect an arrest without probable cause 
or a detention without reasonable suspicion, but use no more force than would 
have been reasonably necessary if the arrest or the detention were warranted, the 
plaintiff has a claim for unlawful arrest or detention but not an additional claim 
for excessive force.”). 
86 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1126 (en banc). 
90 Id. at 1125. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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model.95 In Johnson v. Glick, the court adopted a four-factor test to 
resolve Section 1983 excessive-force claims.96 As described by the 
Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, this test requires the court to 
consider the following four factors when determining whether force was 
excessive under the substantive due process clause: (1) “the need for the 
application of force,” (2) “the relationship between that need and the 
amount of force that was used,” (3) “the extent of the injury inflicted,” 
and (4) “[w]hether the force was applied in a good faith effort to 
maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm.”97   
 Alternatively, a court could apply the Rochin v. California98 
“shocks the conscience” standard—the standard that inspired the 
Johnson v. Glick four-factor test. In Rochin, the Supreme Court held that 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required reversal of 
a conviction that depended upon evidence obtained by forcibly pumping 
a suspect’s stomach.99 In reversing, the Court concluded that such 
conduct “shocks the conscience,” reasoning that the action involved was 
constitutionally indistinguishable from “the rack and screw.”100 
C. Overcoming Qualified Immunity 
 Even if the conduct violates the controlling constitutional 
standard, public officials are not liable for civil damages unless they 
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”101 An action violates a clearly 
established rule when the unlawfulness of the action, upon consideration, 
would be apparent to a reasonable public official.102 To answer this 
question in the context of excessive-force, a court looks to excessive-
force precedent at the time the force was applied and determines whether 
                                                      
95 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 (noting that a majority of federal courts have 
applied this standard without considering whether a more appropriate 
constitutional standard might apply). 
96 Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. 
97 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. 
98 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). See also Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (explaining that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity exists to balance the need for holding irresponsible public officials 
accountable with the equally important need for protecting reasonable public 
action in the face of legal uncertainty). 
102 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (stating with precision the level of generality 
meant by “clearly established”). 
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the officer had fair warning that his or her actions would constitute 
excessive-force under those or similar circumstances.103  
III. THE U.C. DAVIS PEPPERSPRAY INCIDENT REIMAGINED 
 This Section will examine the ADS as if it had been used instead 
of pepperspray at the now infamous UC Davis pepperspray incident.104 
Part A provides a brief description of the actual event. Part B then uses 
those facts to reimagine the incident as if the police had used the ADS 
instead of pepperspray. 
A. The Real U.C. Davis Pepperspray Incident 
 In the fall of 2011, protest was in the air.105 What began as a 
small group of protesters in New York City quickly gained steam to 
become a national Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement.106 But OWS 
was not a stereotypical protest movement with citizens marching in the 
streets during the day and then going home at night. To the contrary, the 
signature protest tactic of OWS was to, as its name suggests, occupy 
public spaces indefinitely.107 Though it was this innovative tactic that 
arguably helped the movement gain strength, it was also this tactic that 
concerned public officials and brought many protestors face-to-face with 
law-enforcement.108 
 Before November 18, 2011, students participating in the OWS 
movement at U.C. Davis erected tents and occupied the university 
quad.109 When the University’s Chancellor ordered the students to 
remove the tents and leave the quad, many refused.110 In response, on 
                                                      
103 See, e.g., Rahn v. Hawkins, 73 F. App’x 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that a right was clearly established as part of its excessive-force analysis by 
looking to case precedent). 
104 Methodological problems aside, because no ADS has ever been deployed by 
police against civilians, and because this note seeks to anticipate the legal 
consequences of doing so, a “what if” hypothetical tethered to the facts of a real 
case is the best one can do. 
105 See generally Andersen, supra note 16. 
106 See Ishaan Tharoor, Occupy Wall Street: A New Era of Dissent in America?, 
TIME, Oct. 12, 2011, available at http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/ 
10/12/occupy-wall-street-a-new-era-of-dissent-in-america/ (describing rise of 
Occupy Wall Street movement). 
107 Chris Hawley, After raids, Wall Street Protesters Shift Tactics, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 1, 2011, at A9. 
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109 Gould, supra note 18. 
110 Jason Cherkis, UC Davis Police Pepper-Spray Seated Students In Occupy 
Dispute, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2011, 10:59 AM), http://www.huffington 
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November 18, 2011, university police armed with riot gear, pepperspray 
bullets, and pepperspray cans attempted to remove tents and other 
encampment items on the quad.111 On their way to the quad, a sizable 
group of students formed a large human circle around the officers.112 
Several dozen of those students sat down in a line on a concrete sidewalk 
directly in the path of the oncoming officers.113 Despite a police warning 
to get out of the way, those students remained seated, locked arms, and 
refused to move.114 At that point, officers conspicuously shook bright 
orange cans of pepperspray, alerting everyone that the students would be 
sprayed if they failed to comply.115 Before administering the 
pepperspray, one officer attempted to pull one of the students in the line 
from her sitting position, but was unable to do so.116 Shortly thereafter, 
another officer stepped over the line of students to join another group of 
officers who were already on the other side.117  
 What happened next shocked many across the nation. With at 
least four cameras recording and a large crowd of students observing, 
two police officers began to walk parallel to the sitting line of students, 
and began spraying orange pepperspray directly into their faces from 
only a few feet away.118 Observing students shouted “shame” and 
attempted to render first aid to the peppersprayed protestors.119 After 
administering the pepperspray, the police successfully pulled the arm-
locked students apart from each other.120 Video shows police arresting 
some of these students but leaving others behind as the crowd of students 
swelled and pushed in on the officers, forcing the officers away from the 
area.121 
 Although campus police argued that its actions were justified 
because the line of sitting students cutoff the police’s movement,122 no 
                                                                                                                         
post.com/2011/11/19/uc-davis-police-pepper-spray-students_n_1102728.html 
(updated Nov. 20, 2011, 7:22 PM). 
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113 Andy Baio, UC Davis Pepper Spray Incident, Four Perspectives, YOUTUBE 
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violence occurred—with the exception of that committed by the police 
officers.123 County prosecutors refused to prosecute the protestors, citing 
insufficient information in the U.C. Davis police reports.124 The two 
officers who peppersprayed the students, however, were suspended 
pending an investigation.125 Despite calls for her resignation, the 
Chancellor of U.C. Davis survived a no-confidence vote after 
apologizing for the incident.126 Not surprisingly, on February 22, 2012, 
seventeen students, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, 
filed a Section 1983 lawsuit in the Northern District of California 
alleging the use of excessive-force by various university administration 
officials.127 In March of 2012, the University released the results of its 
investigation in “The Reynoso Task Force Report.”128 In addition to 
stating that the incident “should have and could have been prevented,” 
the report declared the officers’ use of force to be “objectively 
unreasonable.”129 On September 13, the University announced that it had 
reached a settlement with the ACLU and the students, though the details 
of that settlement have not been made available to the public.130 
B. The Real Event Reimagined 
 Now, imagine that the two police officers who peppersprayed the 
protesting line of sitting students had used the ADS instead:  
 The police order the students off the side walk, warn them that 
failure to do so will result in their being shot (this time with the ADS, not 
pepperspray), then make at least one attempt to remove a protestor or 
two by hand. This does not work, so law-enforcement’s next step is to 
                                                                                                                         
Force Report, THE REYNOSO TASK FORCE, at 18, http://reynosore 
port.ucdavis.edu/reynoso-report.pdf (March 2012). 
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use the ADS. The arm-locked students resist at first, but within five 
seconds the heating sensation caused by the ADS becomes so great that 
they release their arms and run out of the way. The only thing a video 
camera can record is a verbal warning, a brief pause, then a scattering of 
the sitting students and any other students caught in the beam. The 
students, after being immediately relieved from the heat, might consider 
sitting down again and continuing the protest. This, however, would 
prove fruitless after a short while, when time and time again they would 
be subjected to the ADS produced oven-like heat. All the while, the ADS 
would be entirely out of sight, potentially thousands of feet away. Any 
officers standing near the students would probably stand still while on 
guard in order avoid the millimeter wave beam. In a short while the 
protest would be over and the students would not even know what hit 
them. 
 This scenario may be too rosy; a less idyllic scenario is certainly 
possible. Army field tests show that the amount of time individuals can 
tolerate the heat varies. Those individuals more capable of withstanding 
the heat who lock arms with fellow protestors might hold on to those less 
capable of withstanding the heat and causing those less capable to 
experience excruciating, if temporary, pain. Also, though a standing 
individual might be able to run away from the beam, a sitting individual 
might not. If a human body could do nothing but run when subjected to 
the beam, then that might leave sitting protesters, incapable of running 
simply because they are sitting, writhing on the ground in pain. Even if 
sitting individuals could escape the beam, the additional time it takes to 
stand and run might result in second or third-degree burns, which the 
ADS is technically capable of producing with excessive exposure. Unless 
the police are capable of tracking the exposure intervals of those 
subjected to the beam—something reports indicate the ADS is not yet 
capable of doing—then a few protestors could be subjected to repeated 
exposure, excruciating pain, and maybe even serious burns. Indeed, the 
army provided fifteen-second intervals between exposures to its test 
subjects. If someone does receive burns, like a sunburn, she might not 
know of it immediately, and might subject herself to continued exposures 
without knowing she is being severely burned. Finally, in the chaos that 
would likely follow use of the beam, onlookers risk being trampled by 
fellow students, which might cause severe or life-threatening injuries. 
 Though, to date, the ADS has never been used in such a real-
world crowd-control situation, imagining such a scene is necessary 
because the device is theoretically and technically capable of producing 
such consequences. To be sure, the potentially adverse consequences of 
using the ADS for crowd-control are disturbing. But even the typical, 
non-injurious case is legally noteworthy.  
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IV. APPLICATION OF EXCESSIVE-FORCE JURISPRUDENCE TO ADS 
A. The Standard of Conduct Most Appropriate for a Section 1983 
Claim 
 Whether the Fourth Amendment would apply to the reimagined 
event is unclear. During the real event, the two police officers standing 
but a few feet from the students walked up and down the line of sitting 
students applying bright orange pepper-spray to their faces. But in the 
reimagined event, the officers are standing some distance away from the 
students to avoid being affected by the ADS beam, the officer’s 
application of force (the beam) is completely invisible and totally 
inaudible,131 and, instead of incapacitating the students, the beam 
produces a heating sensation that forces the students to instinctively 
flee.132  
 Upon review, the police could argue that the students had been 
seized when they complied with police commands to move, and had 
thereby submitted to the show of authority by the police. This of course, 
would be a fiction. The students did not move voluntarily at all. They 
only moved because they were peppersprayed, or in the reimagined 
scenario, subjected to the ADS. And if the police concede that the 
movement was involuntary, then that fact only reinforces the case that 
the ADS, although completely unseen, is still physical force for the 
purposes of Fourth Amendment seizure.133  
 Use of the ADS would thus create a Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudential paradox: an individual is simultaneously seized and not 
seized under the Fourth Amendment. Recall that, under Hodari, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of seizure are the following:  
• Sufficient Conditions: The individual submits to a show of 
authority by the police or the police apply physical force to 
the individual. 
                                                      
131 Jackson, supra note 2. 
132 Press Release, supra note 16. 
133 This is arguably a fiction. An arrestee may not ever see a bullet or the 
electrons rushing into their body from a TASER. Still, the individual is likely to 
see a gun, a TASER, the prongs of the TASER, etc. Here, an individual may 
never see the ADS and certainly will not see the millimeter waves. That, in 
combination with the fact that officers near those exposed to the beam would 
appear to those around them as not administering the force, makes for a legally 
unprecedented situation. 
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• Necessary Condition: A reasonable person would not feel 
free to leave. 134 
 Normally, these two conditions exist in harmony. But the ADS 
uses physical force specifically designed to make people flee, without 
incapacitating them. Physical force is used (sufficient condition of 
seizure), but the force makes it unreasonable for a person to believe that 
he or she is free to stay (necessary condition of seizure). This means the 
sufficient condition is met at the same time the necessary condition is 
not. Hence, a legal paradox.   
 Some may question how use of the ADS is any different from 
hosing down a crowd. While it is true that a water hose uses force to 
disperse a crowd, unlike hosing down a crowd, the ADS acts invisibly, 
inaudibly, and without giving the individual subjected to the beam any 
indication of what is happening. The individual is fine one moment, but 
not the next. One moment the individual is protesting, the next the 
individual is heating up, rapidly, and with no indication of how or why. 
There is no water, no noise, no fire truck: just a sudden and intense 
feeling of being in a hot oven, followed by an inexorable command from 
the brain to the body to flee. In such a situation, it is unclear whether a 
person even has the mental capacity to consider whether she “felt free to 
leave,” let alone whether, upon review, a reasonable person would or 
would not have felt free to leave. The ADS thus raises doubts about the 
proper meaning and application of the “free to leave” standard in a way 
that water hoses do not. 
 Before Section 1983 analysis can continue, a threshold question 
of law must be resolved. At this point, the Supreme Court appears 
unwilling to jettison either the necessary or sufficient condition, if only 
because the Court has described the conditions as “necessary” and 
“sufficient.”135 If the Fourth Amendment does not apply, then only the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are left. And because the Eighth 
Amendment obviously does not apply to a pre-conviction use of force, 
the only remaining standard is the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause. 
 Without knowing with certainty which standard applies, it is 
necessary to analyze the Section 1983 claim under both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 
                                                      
134 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). 
135 Id.  
No. 2] COOKING PROTESTORS ALIVE 350 
B. Deciding Whether Use of Force Violated Governing Standard 
1. Applying the Fourth Amendment 
 If the Fourth Amendment governs the seizure, the ultimate 
question is whether the force used by the police officers was reasonable 
under the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable officer.136 
 The analysis begins with the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the use of force. In this case, those facts and circumstances 
are part hypothetical and part real. The first factor to consider is the 
severity of the crime at issue. Unfortunately, whether any crime occurred 
in either the original or reimagined scenario is unclear. There are a few 
possibilities. The first possibility is that the students commit a crime by 
encircling the police and preventing them from performing their official 
police duties. But the officers appeared to be concerned only with the 
students sitting in a line along the university pathway. If encircling the 
police and preventing them from performing their duties is a crime, then 
every student, not just those in the walkway, would be subject to seizure 
and the use of force to effectuate that seizure. Of course, police 
discretion could explain why the police choose to focus on only those 
students sitting down in front of them. A second possibility is that the 
offense occurs when the protestors block university traffic by sitting in 
the middle of a university pathway and refuse to move when ordered by 
the police. This would explain why only those students sitting on the 
pathway are ordered to move and why the police focus all their attention 
on these students. In either scenario, the crimes at issue are minor at best. 
 The facts and circumstances of both scenarios also favor the 
students when considering the second factor: whether the individual 
poses an immediate threat to the safety of others, including police. In 
neither scenario do the suspects pose an immediate threat to the safety of 
the officers or others. At no time do the sitting students display any 
potential to commit violence against the officers or attempt to do so. At 
no time prior to the use of the crowd-control device do the officers act as 
though they are being threatened or as though their safety is at risk. The 
officers act dispassionately, calmly, and even slowly. At one point, they 
stand around for several minutes, doing nothing at all. Video shows one 
officer even stepping over the line without anyone even so much as 
attempting to block him. Furthermore, all of these events occur on 
campus with students, not off campus with totally unknown persons. 
 Regarding the third factor—actively resisting arrest—it is 
unclear in either scenario whether the students are resisting arrest or just 
                                                      
136 See supra Part II.B.1.  
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the police officers’ commands to move. It is clear, however, that the 
students are not actively resisting arrest. The only attempt by the police 
to effectuate arrest is met with the limp arm of a student whose other arm 
is locked with those of fellow students. Such conduct fits the classic 
definition of passive resistance.137  
 Though not a listed factor, that the police have non-
confrontational alternatives in either scenario suggests that the use of 
force is unreasonable. It is unclear why the police do not attempt to walk 
around the line of protestors sitting on the sidewalk. A video recording of 
the Davis confrontation shows numerous holes in the so-called “circle” 
of protestors that would have allowed for easy passage by the police.138 
The video also shows the police even step over the line of sitting 
protestors without fanfare or resistance. By all appearances, the officers 
could have avoided the confrontation altogether and gone about their 
work of removing the tents from the quad. In the reimagined scenario, 
there is no reason to believe the officers’ actions would be any different.  
 Under either scenario, then, the officers’ actions appear 
unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. This conclusion is 
bolstered by the findings of the University’s independent investigation of 
the incident, which concluded that the police officers’ use of pepperspray 
on the line of sitting students was objectively unreasonable.139 Use of the 
ADS would likewise constitute excessive-force, even if the ADS is less 
harmful than pepperspray. Of course, a court might, and probably should, 
take into consideration the lesser degree of harm caused by the ADS in 
the reimagined scenario. Still, no one knows whether this difference 
alone could or would outweigh the factors concerning both protestor and 
police behavior that point toward the latter’s unreasonableness. For the 
purposes of this analysis, it suffices to say that the decision would be a 
                                                      
137 See Drews v. Maryland, 381 U.S. 421, 425 (1965) (“Then all five members 
of the group briefly linked arms, and, in a further show of passive resistance, the 
three men dropped to the ground. They did not, the police officers testified, offer 
anything in the way of active resistance to either arrest or ejection. As Judge 
Oppenheimer observed: ‘In resisting the command of the officers to leave the 
park, the defendants used no force against the officers or anyone else; they held 
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indeed, the only words spoken were in the nature of a plea for forgiveness of one 
of the mob. All they did was refuse to assist in their own ejection from a 
segregated amusement park.”) (citations omitted). 
138 Baio supra, note 113. 
139 See UC Davis November 18, 2011 “Pepper Spray Incident” Task 
Force Report, supra note 129 at 18–19 (performing a reasonableness analysis of 
the police officers’ actions on November 18, 2011, and concluding their actions 
were objectively unreasonable). 
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close one, and that the outcomes of excessive-force lawsuits would likely 
diverge.  
2. Applying the Fourteenth Amendment 
 If the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause applies, then 
the court must apply either the four-part Johnson v. Glick test or evaluate 
the police conduct under the “shocks the conscience” standard. Use of 
the ADS would most likely survive either standard.  
 It is unlikely that use of the ADS would constitute excessive-
force under the Johnson v. Glick four-factor test. First, in both scenarios, 
the need to use force is admittedly low. The police do not need to 
disperse the line of students because the police could safely step over or 
walk around them. But, once police choose to disperse the line of 
protestors—a choice outside the scope of an excessive-force inquiry—
the police officers would, and do, have difficulty removing the students 
without using some degree of force. Hence, a “need” to use force.  
 Second, even if the need to use force may be minimal, that factor 
is offset by the fact that the ADS does not typically cause serious or 
lasting injury. As long as the device works as intended, the students’ pain 
would dissipate within seconds and leave no injuries, save perhaps for an 
occasional blister. As with any other nonlethal device, a worst-case 
scenario could mean the ADS produces excruciating pain and leaves 
lasting, potentially even lethal injuries. But like TASERs and 
pepperspray, the dangerousness of a device for the purposes of 
excessive-force claims under this factor is judged by the typical case, not 
by the worst possible outcome.  
 Third, the actual injuries inflicted are likely to be non-existent 
after a few seconds of the application of force. Greater injuries, though 
not likely, are considered here if they arise. This Issue Brief assumes 
typical, non-injurious results.  
 Finally, though some may claim that the officers act maliciously 
in each scenario, there is no evidence that the officers’ real purpose is to 
cause harm. The officers act dispassionately and with patience, not rashly 
or out of passion. The police warn the students and give them ample 
opportunity to leave. The officers do not execute a sadistic plan to cause 
harm to students. To the contrary, they manifest a lawful motive: intent 
to effectuate a valid law-enforcement objective, namely, the seizure and 
arrest of protesting students who fail to abide by what the officers believe 
to be lawful commands. To be sure, the apparent existence of non-
confrontational alternatives makes it appear that the police choose 
confrontation. Still, even if such alternatives were judged real and 
practical, a choice by police to use force to effectuate a lawful or even 
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arguably unlawful arrest is a far cry from evidencing malicious or 
sadistic intent on the part of the officer. Without more, it is highly 
unlikely a judge would find that the officers acted maliciously, given 
their cool-headed demeanor and repeated warnings before using force.  
 We are thus left with the “shocks the conscience” standard, the 
predecessor to and inspiration for the Johnson v. Glick test. Applying a 
device to a student protestor that essentially cooks her alive might be 
shocking to many. Indeed, the “shocks the conscience” standard 
connotes a kind of psychological repugnance not accounted for in the 
Johnson v. Glick test. When the Supreme Court articulated this standard 
in Rochin, it was applying it to the forceful pumping of an arrestee’s 
stomach for evidence—something less physically painful than it is 
mentally “shocking” to the rest of society. Thus, even if, like stomach 
pumping, the ADS does not cause lasting injury in the vast majority of 
exposures, its use may still “shock the conscience,” especially when 
applied to non-violent student protestors on a university campus.  
 Though the thought of “cooking someone alive” is quite 
disturbing, when one actually watches video of a person exposed to the 
ADS, the imagery bears little resemblance to the barbarism of the rack 
and screw or the repugnance of a the police forcing a tube into a person’s 
stomach.140 When a person is exposed to the ADS, one moment the 
person is behaving normally, the next moment she is running, and the 
next moment she appears to be back to normal.141 Such a display looks 
especially benign in comparison to the lasting injuries and pain produced 
by chemical irritants like pepperspray.142 One might even argue that the 
use of anything other than the ADS is excessive, thus flipping on its head 
the argument that the ADS is per se excessive-force. And because the 
use of chemical irritants like pepperspray also produces a burning 
sensation, it is hyperbolic to suggest that a less painful, more 
abbreviated, and immediately subsiding infliction of “heat” would 
“shock the conscience” if pepperspray, TASERs, or other commonly 
used nonlethal weapons do not. 
 
 
                                                      
140 See, e.g., Milner, supra note 5 (demonstrating the ADS on various 
individuals and on a crowd who on occasion laugh and smile when they are 
subjected to the beam). 
141 See id. (showing targeted persons departing the beam calmly). 
142 See, e.g., chris01659, Pepper Spray Demo, YOUTUBE (Dec. 27, 2008), 
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C. Overcoming Qualified Immunity 
 The qualified immunity inquiry would focus on whether the 
constitutional rights of the arm-locked student protestors were clearly 
established at the time of the use of force. Here, it is not even clear which 
constitutional standard governs, let alone whether law-enforcement’s 
actions are consistent with that governing standard. In such an 
unprecedented situation, qualified immunity is sure to apply even if a 
reviewing court holds the law-enforcement’s application of force to be 
unconstitutionally excessive. In future cases, however, qualified 
immunity will cease to protect officers for that same conduct, so any 
additional qualified immunity analysis irrelevant for the purposes of this 
Issue Brief. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCESSIVE-FORCE JURISPRUDENCE 
 The application of current excessive-force jurisprudence to the 
ADS under the U.C. Davis hypothetical raises major questions about the 
ADS and the state of excessive-force jurisprudence. 
 First, excessive-force jurisprudence is not ready for the ADS. 
Because the ADS is a form of physical contact that makes it 
reasonable—biologically mandatory, in fact—for a person to leave, a 
person is simultaneously seized and yet not seized under existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Courts, reluctant to jettison long standing 
precedent, are likely to struggle with this issue. Consequently, resolution 
of this paradox will likely have far reaching effects and consequences 
due to how vital and central seizure doctrine is for day-to-day law-
enforcement activities.  
 Second, if the Fourth Amendment does not apply, then the 
Fourteenth Amendment would—producing dramatically different results 
for almost identical police conduct. As revealed by the analysis in Part 
III.B.2, an arguably unreasonable use of force would not come close to 
“shocking the conscience” and would probably not violate Johnson v. 
Glick. This disparity in result among similarly situated people cannot 
adequately be explained by reference to the fact that the ADS uses heat 
to force someone to flee while other nonlethal weapons use heat to 
incapacitate. It is even less adequate if something goes wrong and the 
ADS produces severe burns or even death. To say that someone who dies 
as a result of being electrocuted by a TASER is entitled to relief while 
someone who dies as a result of being burned by the ADS is not, offends 
basic notions of fairness and justice. 
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 Third, the invisibility of the ADS changes the game.143 Although 
video cameras like those at the U.C. Davis incident bring clarity to the 
situation and hold protestors and officers accountable, the ADS works 
invisibly and inaudibly. As a result, the ADS presents a far less 
compelling and sympathetic image of protestors.144 Instead of watching 
imagery reminiscent of Mohatma Ghandi or the great nonviolent protests 
of the civil rights era, television and internet viewers will see what looks 
to be a strange, perhaps even humorous scene, where one minute student 
protestors are standing their ground and the next they are scattering for 
no discernible reason. As long as the ADS is used correctly and the 
device works as intended, students will not have bright orange 
pepperspray, swollen eyelids, red skin, and sobs to display for the 
camera.145  
 Fourth, and related to the third, though pepperpsray and TASERs 
are arguably a crude and occasionally excessive means of disrupting 
protestors, they at least provide protestors with a means of gathering 
media attention and sympathy for their cause.146 The ADS seems poised 
to arm the police with a weapon that will completely silence their protest 
by not only preventing them from holding their ground, but by dispersing 
them in such a humane way that there is almost no way to garner 
sympathy or media attention. Due to the nature of how the ADS works, it 
will be more difficult for protestors to sacrifice themselves for a greater 
cause, or make themselves a symbol for a protest movement. Thus, one 
might argue that the real threat of the ADS is not the distortion of 
excessive-force jurisprudence, but the virtual elimination of a venerable 
form of free speech. 
 Ultimately, legislation is likely the most appropriate way to 
resolve some of these problems. Carefully tailored legislation can meet 
the need for safe and effective law-enforcement while still respecting 
prevailing social norms related to human dignity and freedom of speech. 
Legislation might also create a statutory framework for resolving 
excessive-force claims, eliminating the need for courts to resolve 
difficult constitutional questions each time a new technology—like the 
ADS—threatens to create a paradox out of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.    
                                                      
143 Kenyon, supra note 10 (calling the ADS a “game changer”). 
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145 See, e.g., chris01659, supra note 142. 
146 See Cherkis, supra note 110 (noting how the police actions garnered more 
support for the Occupy Davis cause). 
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CONCLUSION 
 The ADS is unlike any other nonlethal weapon. Instead of 
incapacitating its targets, it forces them to flee, and it does so without 
being seen or heard. Overall, its potential as the “holy grail of crowd-
control” is quite promising, at least from a law-enforcement perspective. 
But when the ADS is finally used, its use in dispersing protestors will 
leave courts and society in a quandary. Not only would excessive-force 
claims arising from its use create a Fourth Amendment jurisprudential 
paradox, but there is a risk that the resolution of that paradox would 
undermine other constitutional principles such as equality, fairness, and 
free speech. Ultimately, the likelihood that law-enforcement will use the 
ADS to control protestors serves as a warning that absent legislation, 
American jurisprudence may not be ready for the next generation of law-
enforcement technology and the novel excessive-force claims that are 
sure to follow. 
